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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment
to Respondents, Jonathan L. Lowry ("Lowry") and Nathan Kinsella ("Kinsella").
Petitioner Jones & Trevor Marketing ("J&T") presented significant evidence of the alter
ego factors enumerated in Colman v. Colman. Although J&T's evidence focused
primarily on the fagade factor, there is no reason why substantial evidence supporting one
alter ego factor cannot satisfy the unity of interest nrong of the alter ego test. J&T's
evidence contradicts the facts offered by Lowry and Kinsella in support of summary
judgment. Accordingly, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to J&T, there are
genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment in favour of Lowry and
Kinsella.
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment
to Lowry and Kinsella. This Court reviews "the court of appeals' decision for
correctness. The review focuses on whether the court of appeals correctly reviewed the
trial court's decision . . . under the appropriate standard of review/' Orvis v. Johnson,
2008 UT 2, T| 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal citations omitted). "When an appellate court
reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, while the district court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary
judgment are reviewed for correctness/' Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, ^ 8, 152 P.3d
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312 (internal quotations and citations omitted). With respect to legal conclusions and
judgment, this Court gives "no deference to the district court/' Raab v. Utah Ry. Co.,
2009 UT 61,110, 221 P.3d 219.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to J&T, the nonmoving party,
summary judgment was inappropriate. This Court should therefore reverse the court of
appeals' decision and remand for a trial on the application of the alter ego doctrine.
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO LOWRY AND
KINSELLA.
The court of appeals incorrectly affirmed the trial court's grant of summary

judgment to Lowry and Kinsella.
Generally, "a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its officers,
shareholders and directors and . . . they will not be held personally liable for the
corporations' debts and obligations." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). However, under the alter ego doctrine,
"courts [may], upon a proper showing, disregard the integrity of the corporation and view
a controlling shareholder as indistinguishable from the corporation, thereby permitting
creditors of the corporation to reach the assets of a controlling shareholder."
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah
1990) (citations omitted). "This [is] done to prevent the legal separation between the
corporation and the controlling shareholder from being used to perpetuate an injustice on
third parties." Id. The alter ego doctrine "is an equitable doctrine requiring that each case
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be determined upon its peculiar facts." Salt Lake City Corp v. James Constructors, 761
P.2d 42, 47 (Utah Ct App. 1988) (citing Nat 7 Bond Fin Co v Gen. Motors Corp , 341
F.2d 10225 1023 (8th Cir. 1965)).
To invoke the alter ego doctrine,
there must be a concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there must be such a
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact,
the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable
result would follow.
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979).
The following factors "are deemed significant, although not conclusive, in
determining whether this test has been met":
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe
corporate formalities; (3) non-payment of dividends; (4) siphoning of
corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) non-functioning of other
officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or

fraud.
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing Ramsey v. Adams,
603 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Kan. Ct. App. 1919))', Amoco Chems. Corp. v. Bach. 567 P.2d
1337, 1341-42 (Km. 1977)). In addition to the above factors, courts "look[] through
fonn to substance and ha[ve] often disregarded the corporate form when it was fiction in
fact and deed and was merely serving the personal use and convenience of the owner."
Id. at 786 (quoting Lyons v Lyons, 340 So. 2d 450, 451 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976)).
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A.

J&T Produced Sufficient Evidence to Preclude Summary Judgment on
Its Alter Ego Claim.

J&T presented significant evidence of the Colman factors. J&T presented
evidence that Lowry and Kinsella used their corporations "as a fa9ade for operations of
the dominant stockholder or stockholders." Specifically, J&T presented evidence that
Lowry and Kinsella took thousands of dollars of company proceeds for personal use, such
as hunting trips, without proper documentation or accounting. (R. 1643.) J&T also
presented evidence that Lowry and Kinsella took money from Financial Development
Services, Inc. ("FDS") and Esbex.com ("Esbex") to fund their personal interests, without
proper accounting and in disregard of the money needed to run the corporations (R. 164246).
In their brief, Lowry and Kinsella assert that they submitted articles of
incorporation for FDS and Esbex demonstrating that the corporations observed corporate
formalities and that this evidence is sufficient to preclude piercing the corporate veil
under the alter ego theory. See Respondents' Brief at 16-17. Lowry and Kinsella rely on
Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In Schafir, the court found that
evidence of a corporation's articles of incorporation, minutes from board of director's
meetings, a corporate annual report filed with the State of Utah, and corporate tax returns
sufficiently demonstrated that the corporation observed corporate formalities. 879 P.2d at
1390. However, unlike this case, the appellants in Schafir, who opposed summary
judgment on their alter ego claim, did not set forth any facts to contradict this evidence.
See id. at 1389-90. In this case, J&T has presented evidence to contradict Lowry and
4

Kinsella's evidence. In addition to evidence showing that Lowry and Kinsella used thencorporations "as a fa?ade for operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders,"
J&T presented evidence of several other Colman factors.
For example, J&T presented evidence of "siphoning of corporate funds by the
dominant stockholder." Specifically, J&T presented evidence that Kinsella took money
from FDS without telling Lowry (R. 1644-45.) Indeed, Lowry and Kinsella acknowledge,
in their brief, that "there is some testimony in Neubauer's deposition that in his
bankruptcy deposition Neubauer mentioned that he thought he had discovered that
Kinsella was'stealing' from Lowry." See Respondents' Briefat 20. Also, J&T presented
evidence that Lowry and Kinsella used "the corporate entity in promoting injustice or
fraud." Specifically, J&T presented evidence that Lowry and Kinsella kept returned
products and resold them to new customers (R. 1642.) J&T presented evidence that
Lowry and Kinsella knew that they were taking money earmarked for customer refunds
(R. 1643-44.) J&T also presented evidence that Lowry and Kinsella knowingly sold ongoing coaching services and failed to report those fees to J&T as required by the contract
(R. 1644.) J&T also presented evidence of "undercapitalization." Specifically, J&T
presented evidence of the insolvency and dissolution of FDS and Esbex in November
2004 (R. 1695.)
Finally, contrary to Lowry and Kinsella's assertions, J&T also presented evidence
relevant to the second prong of the alter ego doctrine. The second prong requires a
showing that the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote
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injustice, or be followed by an inequitable result. The second prong can be met by
"show[ing] that the corporation itself played a role in the inequitable conduct at issue."
Transamerica, 789 P.2d at 26 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). J&T has
presented evidence that Lowry and Kinsella ran FDS and Esbex as if the two corporations
were one entity (R. 1294-95.) As a general rule, satisfaction of this prong "is left to the
conscience of the court." d'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, U 30, 147 P.3d 515
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
These material disputed facts are sufficient to preclude summary judgment in
favour of Lowry and Kinsella. At the summary judgment stage, J&T was not required to
prove its alter ego theory. Rather, J&T was only required to show facts that contradict
Lowry and Kinsella's facts in support of summary judgment.
In James Constructors, the appellant challenged the trial court's summary
judgment in favour of the appellee. 761 P.2d at 43. The appellant argued that summary
judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning
whether a subsidiary corporation was the alter ego of its parent corporation. Id. at 45.
The Utah Court of Appeals found that the appellant's affidavit in opposition to the
appellee's motion for summary judgment, read in the light most favourable to the
appellant, set forth sufficient disputed facts to preclude summary judgment. Id. at 47.
The appellant's affidavit set forth facts showing that the parent corporation owned 100%
of the subsidiary's capital stock; the parent corporation financed the subsidiary and had
paid some of its debts; the subsidiary was undercapitalized; the parent corporation's
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directors and officers did not act independently of the corporation; and the parent
corporation had advanced funds to the subsidiary on an "as needed'' basis, with no formal
documentation and no specific requirements for repayment. Id.
The court explained that "for [the appellant] to successfully oppose [the
appellee's] motion for summary judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it [was] not
necessary for it to actually prove its alter ego theory.... It [was] only necessary for [the
appellant] to show 'facts' which controvert the 'facts' stated in [the appellee's] affidavit."
Id Given the facts stated in the appellant's affidavit, the court concluded that the
appellant showed unresolved factual questions that made the grant of summary judgment
to the appellee inappropriate.
Like the appellant in James Constructors. J&T was not required to prove its alter
ego theory to successfully oppose Lowry and Kinsella's motion for summary judgment.
J&T was only required to show facts that controvert Lowry and Kinsella's facts. Further,
like the appellant in James Constructors, J&T has met its burden. Specifically, J&T has
shown the following facts that controvert Lowry and Kinsella's facts: Lowry and
Kinsella took thousands of dollars of company proceeds for personal use, such as hunting
trips, without proper documentation or accounting (R. 1643); Lowry and Kinsella took
money from FDS and Esbex to fund their personal interests, without proper accounting
and in disregard of the money needed to run the corporations (R. 1642-46); Kinsella took
money from FDS without telling Lowry (R. 1644-45); Lowry and Kinsella kept returned
products and resold them to new customers (R. 1642); Lowry and Kinsella knew that
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they were taking money earmarked for customer refunds (R. 1643-44); Lowry and
Kinsella knowingly sold on-going coaching services and failed to report those fees to
J&T as required by the contract (R. 1644); and FDS and Esbex were undercapitalized (R.
1695.) Accordingly, like the appellant in James Constructors, J&T has shown unresolved
factual questions that make the grant of summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella
inappropriate. Consequently, the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's grant
of summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella.
B.

The Court of Appeals Erred in Holding that Evidence of Only One
Colman Factor is Insufficient to Permit an Analysis of the Alter Ego
Doctrine.

In addition to failing to consider all of J&T's evidence, the court of appeals also
failed to properly analyze the evidence of the Colman factors. The court noted that
"J&T's argument focuses almost exclusively on . . . [the fa9ade factor]." Jones & Trevor
Mktg. v. Lowiy, 2010 UT App 113, \ 8, 233 P.3d 538. The court then held that "[wjithout
any evidence of the other alter ego factors, we cannot gauge the materiality of the one
factor on which evidence was presented." Id. at \ 10. This was error. First, as discussed
at length above, J&T presented evidence of several alter ego factors, not just the fa9ade
factor.
Second, evidence of one factor, in appropriate circumstances, may be sufficient to
preclude summary judgment. This is because the alter ego doctrine "is an equitable
doctrine requiring that each case be determined upon its peculiar facts." James
Constructors, 761 P.2dat47 (citing Nat'7 Bond Fin. Co., 341 F.2dat 1023).
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Indeed, the Colman court noted that the alter ego factors are "significant, although
not conclusive."' 743 P.2d at 786. In other words, the alter ego factors are intended to
assist a court in determining whether "there is such a unity of interest and ownership that
the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the
corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals." Norman, 596 P.2d at
1030. There is no reason why substantial evidence supporting one factor cannot satisfy
the unity of interest prong of the alter ego test. Ultimately, a court must "look[] through
form to substance/' Colman, 743 P.2d at 786 (quoting Lyons, 340 So.2d at 451). J&T has presented ample evidence in support of invoking the alter ego doctrine:
Lowry and Kinsella were, at all times relevant to this appeal, the sole shareholders,
officers, and directors of FDS and Esbex (R. 1296, 1300, 1693); Lowry and Kinsella ran
FDS and Esbex as if the two corporations were one entity (R. 1294-95); Lowry and
Kinsella were both aware and in control of all of the financial transactions that took place
at FDS and Esbex and determined the allocation of monies to the two entities (R. 164243, 1695); When customers returned J&T products, Lowry and Kinsella kept the refunds
from J&T and, instead of sending the product back to J&T, resold the product to new
customers (R. 1642); Lowry and Kinsella knew that they were taking money earmarked
for J&T customer refunds (R. 1643-44); Lowry and Kinsella instructed their employees to
omit from their reports to J&T the ongoing monthly fees that Esbex and FDS collected
from coaching services (R. 1644); Lowry and Kinsella took thousands of dollars of
company proceeds for personal use, such as hunting trips, without proper documentation
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or accounting and in disregard of the money needed to run the corporations (R. 1642-46);
Kinsella took money from FDS without telling Lowry (R. 1644-45); After FDS
terminated the agreement with J&T, Lowry and Kinsella made the decision to continue
selling coaching, to instruct their employees not to tell J&T about it, and to keep the
money derived from the sales (R. 1641-42); FDS and Esbex in fact continued to sell
coaching services and continued to use Ted Thomas' name in their sales materials (R.
1323-1567); and in November 2004, FDS and Esbex were deemed insolvent and
dissolved (R. 1698.)
Summary judgment "should only be granted when it appears 'there is no
reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail.''' James Constructors,
761 P.2d at 45 (quotingFrisbee v.K&KConstr.

Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984)).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to J&T, there are genuine issues of material
fact concerning J&T's alter ego theory that preclude summary judgment. This Court
should therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand for a trial on the
application of the alter ego doctrine.

10

CONCLUSION
Therefore, J&T respectfully requests that this Court reverse the opinion of the
Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a trial on the application of
the alter ego doctrine.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of January 2011.
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